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Abstract 
 
Previous research shows that the effect of decentralization on damage caused by 
natural disasters will differ according a country‟s level of economic development. To 
investigate this matter further, this paper uses cross-country data from 1990 to 2001 to 
examine how decentralization, institution, and economic development influence the 
number of deaths caused by natural disasters. The major findings are that 
decentralization reduces deaths and its effect is strengthened in countries with lower 
levels of public sector corruption and better functioning legal systems. Furthermore, the 
interaction between decentralization and high quality institutions has a greater 
contribution to the reduction of deaths in more developed countries. 
  
Keywords: Natural disaster, law and order, corruption, economic development.  
 
JEL classification: D73; K10; O1; Q54 
 
 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Exogenous shocks in modern society can produce a significant impact. A natural 
disaster is a prime example of a serious exogenous shock, and since the 2000s 
researchers have paid close attention to the subject from an economic point of view (e.g., 
Tol and Leek 1999; Horwich 2000; Skidmore and Toya 2002; Sawada 2007; Sawada and 
Shimizutani 2007; 2008; Strobl 2011a; 2011b). Disaster prevention measures are now 
provided as a consequence of economic growth. However, the association between GDP 
levels and the damage caused by natural disasters has been found to take an inverted U 
shape, rather than being monotonically negative (Kellenberg and Mobarak 2008). 
Income is an important factor in reducing damage, but has a very small effect when the 
scale of a disaster is small (Yamamura 2010). Income inequality increases the death 
rate in the event of natural disaster (Anbarci et al. 2005). As argued by Albala-Bertrand 
(1993), the issue of disasters cannot be analyzed in isolation from the particular social 
and political setting where disasters occur. Furthermore, in addition to economic 
conditions, previous research has found that institution plays a critical role in reducing 
the damage caused by natural disasters (Kahn 2005; Yamamura 2010).  
The occurrence of natural disasters is not systematically associated with the level 
of economic development (Kahn 2005). Government is necessarily anticipated to 
prepare for a natural disaster and to protect people in its event. Quality of governance 
and government structure can be regarded as the key determinants of reducing the 
damage of natural disasters.1 For example, Escaleras et al. (2007) found a relationship 
between countries with lower levels of corruption and less damage from natural 
disasters. An analysis of the outcome of Hurricane Katrina suggested that the 
centralized agency was not able to make the best use of dispersed information to 
coordinate the demand for available supplies (Sobel and Leeson 2006). This is 
consistent with the argument that local government officials have greater knowledge 
and understanding of local demand than central government (Treisman 2002). 
Congruent with these works, empirical evidence based on panel data suggests that 
decentralization plays a central role in mitigating the damage of natural disasters 
                                                   
1 The channels through which disasters influence economic conditions can be analyzed from 
a political economic point of view. The distortion of allocation through political economy 
channels is considered to indirectly influence the economic condition. In the case of the 
Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) money flow, Garret and Sobel 
(2003) asserted that nearly half of all disaster relief is politically motivated rather than by 
need. Governmental failure increased the damage of Hurricane Katrina (Shughart II 2006). 
Interaction between the geographical features of New Orleans and the failure of the New 
Orleans levee system caused the the catastrophe that followed Katrina (Congleton 2006). 
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(Escaleras and Register 2010; Toya and Skidmore, 2010). Fisman and Gatti (2002a) 
focused on an association between decentralization and corruption and found that 
decentralization is strongly associated with lower levels of corruption.2 However, when 
there is extensive collusion between bureaucrats and local interest groups, it is possible 
for decentralization to have a detrimental influence on economic outcomes. Thus, 
decentralization is less likely to be effective if the public sector is corrupt. In other 
words, a less corrupt government is considered to make decentralization more effective. 
The effect of quality of government on natural disaster outcomes appears to be affected 
by the structure of government. This paper jointly considers the quality of institution 
and structure of government, as opposed to independently, and focuses on the effect of 
the interaction between decentralization and institutional quality on natural disasters. 
Toya and Skidmore (2007) provided the following evidence regarding the 
numerous factors of natural disasters. First, the level of damage caused by natural 
disasters depends on the degree of economic development represented by GDP per 
capita, number of years at school, economic openness, and the comprehensiveness of a 
country‟s financial system; and second, the key determinants of damage are different 
between developing countries and OECD countries. As suggested by Escaleras and 
Register (2010), decentralization has a different effect on developing and developed 
countries in terms of mitigating death rates in a natural disaster.3 However, research in 
this field has yet to identify the underlying reason as to why levels of economic 
development appear to influence the effect of decentralization on deaths from natural 
disasters. In general terms, prior research has not compared developing and developed 
countries with regard to the role played by the structure of government and 
institutional quality in reducing damage from a disaster. Hence, the main purpose of 
this paper is to scrutinize the mechanism of interaction between institutional setting 
and economic development on deaths caused by natural disasters. 
To this end, this paper uses cross-country data from 1990 to 2001 to examine the 
effect of interaction between decentralization and institution on deaths from natural 
disasters, and further investigates how the effect varies according to per capita GDP. 
Major studies show that the levels of damage caused by natural disasters are lower in 
countries with a more decentralized government. The effect of decentralization is 
                                                   
2 Fisman and Gatti (2002b) found that the association between decentralization and 
corruption depends on the degree of devolution of revenue generation to local government. 
3 According to Escaleras and Register (2010), “…we do find fiscal decentralization to be 
associated with lower natural disaster death rates. Interestingly, however, there is some 
evidence that this relation is robust only developing countries.Since the existing data do not 
allow us to definitively explain this latter result, it would seem to be an interesting and 
potentially fruitful area for further study” (Escaleras and Register 2010, section 4). 
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greater in countries with less public sector corruption and better functioning legal 
systems. Furthermore, the interaction between decentralization and institution made a 
greater contribution to the reduction of deaths in more developed countries. The 
remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 proposes the hypotheses to be 
tested; data and methods used are explained in section 3; section 4 discusses the results 
of the estimations; and section 5 offers concluding observations. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
 
Corruption is thought to motivate bureaucrats to direct public expenditure 
through channels that make it easier to collect bribes. Thus, the productivity of the 
project is not considered in the selection of the investment project. This results in the 
distortion of resource allocation. Consequently, large-scale construction projects are 
more likely to be selected than maintenance expenditure. Accordingly, corruption 
reduces the public spending required to keep existing physical infrastructure well 
maintained and safe. A previous study (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997) showed that 
corruption is related to a lower percentage of well-maintained paved roads, and a higher 
percentage of electrical power system losses over total power output. From these results, 
the authors asserted that corruption reduces expenditure on maintenance and 
operations, resulting in low-quality infrastructure (e.g., Tanzi and Davoodi 1997; Tanzi 
2002; Tanzi and Davoodi 2002). Therefore, the damage caused by natural disaster is 
thought to be magnified in more corrupt countries. In addition to the above reason, 
Escaleras et al. (2007) offered an example of public sector corruption where government 
inspectors allow contractors to ignore building codes. Furthermore, such contractors 
cannot be made to comply with building codes if they are operating within a poorly 
functioning legal system. As a result, buildings are seismically insensitive, which 
increases damage levels caused by a natural disaster. 
It has been recently shown that a decentralized local government is effective in 
protecting human life by preparing for unforeseen natural disaster and mitigating the 
associated damage (Escaleras and Register 2010; Toya and Skidmore 2010). However, 
“the local representative bodies and their officers are almost certain to be of a much 
lower grade of intelligence and knowledge, than Parliament and the national executive” 
(Mill 1977, p. 422). In addition, local governments are apt to be susceptible to corruption, 
which lessens their ability to provide local public goods (Tanzi 1995). In contrast, in the 
case that local government attempts to enact legislation to prevent corruption, the 
formal rule determined by the local government should be obeyed to avoid corruption. 
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However, people are unlikely to obey the rule, and corruption will continue to be widely 
practiced. Hence, the effectiveness of decentralized local government is enhanced in less 
corrupt public sectors or when people are likely to obey the law. The following 
Hypothesis 1 is proposed. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Decentralization is more strongly associated with lower levels of damage 
caused by natural disasters under better institutional conditions. 
 
However, assuming that there is a lack of appropriate construction engineering, 
seismically insensitive buildings cannot constructed even when the public sector is not 
corrupt and a quality legal system is present. This implies that quality of institution is 
complementary to technology. Therefore, institution plays a greater role when more 
advanced technology exists. Advanced technology is less likely to exist in developing 
countries. Accordingly, the role of institutions in reducing the damage caused by 
disasters is considered to vary depending on the degree of a nation‟s economic 
development. I postulate Hypothesis 2 as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Interaction between decentralization and institution makes a greater 
contribution to the reduction of damage caused by natural disasters in more developed 
countries. 
 
 
3. Data and Model  
 
3.1. Data  
The study period of this paper was determined because of the data limitations 
detailed below. Data regarding the death toll from natural disasters from 1900 to 2010 
were available from EM-DAT (Emergency Events Database). In this paper, however, the 
data to be used for the proxy for public sector corruption and legal quality4 were only 
available from 1984 to 2010 from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
Furthermore, the data for the proxy variable for decentralization of government covered 
the period 1972–2000, and was sourced from the IMF‟s Government Finance Statistics 
(GFS). To include these key variables in the estimations, I used data from 1990 to 2000 
in this paper. Concerning the other control variables such as GDP (GDP per capita), 
population, fertility, land size, government size, and openness, these were collected from 
                                                   
4 The measure for legal system quality is „law and order‟ in the ICRG. 
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the World Bank (2011). Ethic fractionalization was sourced from HP of Marta 
Reynal-Querol, and political right was obtained from Freedom House 1996. Data for 
GINI (income Gini coefficients) was gathered from the Standardized Income 
Distribution Database (SIDD) developed by Salvatore (2008).5 Civil liberty and political 
liberty were collected from Freedom House 2001. Schooling years was obtained from 
Easterly and Levine (1997). As presented in Table A1 of the Appendix, the number of 
countries covered by the data ranges from 41 to 44. This number varies according to the 
specification of the estimations because the data regarding some independent variables 
could not be collected for certain countries in certain years. Definitions and the basic 
statistics for the variables used in this paper are presented in Table 1. Further, the 
sources of all the data is summarized in Table A2, in the Appendix. 
With respect to the measures of public sector corruption and the state of legal 
systems, „public sector corruption‟ and „quality of legal system‟ values range from 0 to 6. 
„Public sector corruption‟ indicates the likelihood that senior government officials would 
demand special payments in the form of bribes. Thus, the ICRG corruption index 
captures financial corruption. „Quality of legal system‟ reflects the results of 
assessments regarding (1) the strength and impartiality of the legal system and (2) 
popular observance of the law. Larger values indicate less corruption and better legal 
systems. As exhibited in Table 1, the mean value and the standard deviation for the 
ICRG corruption (legal quality) index are 4.56 and 1.31 (4.80 and 1.44), respectively.  
With regard to decentralization, I used the ratio of total sub-national government 
expenditure to total government expenditures, which has been commonly used in 
previous research (e.g., Panizzi 1999; Fisman and Gatti, 2002a; Escaleras and Register 
2010; Toya and Skidmore 2010). As presented in Table 1, the mean value of the number 
of deaths from disasters is 205 and its standard deviation is 1,343, which is nearly 7 
times larger than the mean value. The maximum and minimum values of the number of 
technological disasters are 21800 and 0, respectively, indicating a large gap. In addition, 
Table 2 shows more detailed statistics regarding the distribution of number of deaths 
caused by natural disasters. The sample shows that there were no deaths in 58.7% of 
the observations. The number of fatalities within the ranges of 1–99 and 100–999 
deaths was 26.1% and 10.6%, respectively. In contrast, the number of deaths over 
10,000 was only 0.56%. Considering these results jointly suggests that the number of 
deaths are over-dispersed. The number of deaths from disasters is count data and does 
not take a negative value. Compared with OLS or a Probit model, the Poisson model is 
                                                   
5 The paper used SIDD-3, which is an interpolated and extrapolated version of SIDD-2 
incorporating in-sample and out-of-sample estimates for 1955–2005.  
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more appropriate for the estimation in this situation because the estimation results for 
count data will suffer bias in OLS where dependent values are allowed to take both 
negative and positive values. Furthermore, the dependent variable must take 0 or 1 in a 
Probit model. A Probit model is more suitable to analyze qualitative data than count 
data. However, in the Poisson model, it is assumed that the mean of a dependent 
variable is equal to its variance. As discussed above, the number of deaths from 
disasters is over-dispersed and its variance is large. The use of the Poisson model here 
causes a downward bias and inflates z-statistics, and as such, the negative binominal 
model is preferred (Wooldridge 2002, Ch. 19). The negative binominal model is applied 
for empirical analysis to examine the effect of natural disasters in previous research 
(e.g., Anbarci et al. 2006; Escaleras et al. 2007; Kellenberg and Mobarak 2008) because 
the damage caused by natural disasters is characterized by over-dispersion.6 In line 
with previous literature, the negative binominal model is used in this paper. The 
estimated function takes the following form:  
 
Deaths it = 0 + 1Corruption it + 2Legal it + 3Decentralizationit + 4Ln(GDP)it + 
5Landit + 6Populationit + 7Opennessit + 8Ln(Size of government)it + 9Gini it 
+ 10Ethnic fractionalization i + 11Political right i + 12Libertyi + 
13Ln(Scholing)i + 14Time trendt + eit,  
where the dependent variable is the number of deaths caused by natural 
disasters in country i and in year t. The error term is denoted by e and  represents the 
regression parameters. Unobserved time-invariant features of a country can be 
controlled when fixed effects or random effects estimations are conducted. However, 
fixed effects or random effects methods for a negative binominal model have not been 
developed,7 and therefore, in alternative estimations, with the aim of controlling for the 
unobserved time-invariant features of a country, I also used a random effects Tobit 
model, which was also used by Toya and Skidmore (2010).  
The higher the quality of institution, the lower the level of damage from natural 
disasters. Therefore, I predict the coefficients for Corruption and Legal to take the 
                                                   
6 Log(1+deaths) or Log(1+death rate) has been used as a dependent variable in previous 
research (e.g., Kahn 2005; Escaleras and Register 2010; Toya and Skidmore 2010). This can 
attenuate the over-dispersion of number of deaths. However, when y is a dependent variable, 
“for strictly positive variables, we often use the natural log transformation, log(y), and use a 
linear model. This approach is not possible in interesting count data applications, where y 
takes on the value zero for nontrivial fraction of the population” (Wooldridge 2002, p. 645). 
7 Unobserved time-invariant features of a country can be controlled for when country 
dummies are included in the negative binominal model. Nevertheless, this estimation could 
not be conducted because a maximum likelihood estimation of a negative binominal model 
cannot converge when country dummies are included. 
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negative sign. If decentralization reduces the number of deaths from natural disasters, 
the coefficient of Decentralization will take the negative sign. Toya and Skidmore (2007) 
produced evidence that the determinants of damage resulting from natural disasters 
will differ depending on a nation‟s degree of economic development. Hence, a logarithm 
of GDP per capita represented as Ln(GDP) is incorporated. In addition to the primary 
model above, for the purpose of examining Hypothesis 1, the interaction terms of 
Corruption and Decentralization (and Legal and Decentralization) were included as 
independent variables. If Hypothesis 1 is supported, their coefficients take the negative 
sign. In addition, with the aim of examining Hypothesis 2, these interaction terms were 
further interacted with Ln(GDP). That is, Corruption*Decentralization*Ln(GDP) and 
Legal*Decentralization*Ln(GDP) were incorporated. If Hypothesis 2 is supported, their 
coefficients take the negative sign. 
In addition to Corruption, Legal and Decentralization, following Toya and 
Skidmore (2010), further aspects of a country‟s political condition were captured by 
Political right and Liberty. To capture socio-economic heterogeneity, Gini was included, 
which was also used in Kahn (2005) and Toya and Skidmore (2010). Furthermore, I 
included Ethnic fractionalization, which was also used in the estimation of Escaleras 
and Register (2010). To control for size of country, Land and Population are included. 
Trend was included to capture the unobserved time trends during the study period. 
Other control variables, as used by Toya and Skidmore (2007, 2010), Fertility, Size of 
government, Schooling and Openness are also incorporated.8 Ethnic fractionalization, 
Political right, Liberty, Schooling are the value in a certain year because these variables 
could not be obtained for every year. That is, they are time invariant variables. 
 
4. Results 
The estimation results of the primary model are exhibited in Table 3. Tables 4(a), 
(b) and (c) present the estimation results of key interaction terms such as 
Corruption*Decentralization and Legal*Decentralization. In each table, the results of 
the estimation including all control variables are shown in columns (1)–(3), whereas 
those where some variables were omitted to increase observations are shown in columns 
(4)–(6). However, only the results of key interaction term variables are reported in 
Tables 4(a), (b), and (c) although other control variables used in column (1) of Table 3 
are included in all estimations of Table 4(a), and other control variables used in columns 
                                                   
8 Number of years at school and M3/GDP were incorporated as independent variables by 
Toya and Skidmore (2007). There is no panel data for number of years at school and it is 
captured by country dummies. The sample size is drastically reduced if M3/GDP is included. 
Hence, these variables are not included. 
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(4) of Table 3 are included in all estimations of Tables 4(b) and (c). Further, Tables 3, 
4(a) and (b) present the results of the negative binominal model, while Table 4(c) 
presents the results of the random effects Tobit model to check the robustness of the 
results when the time invariant features of countries are controlled for.  
I begin by interpreting the results of Table 3. As expected, Corruption yields the 
negative sign and is statistically significant in all columns, which is consistent with the 
previous research of Escaleras et al. (2007). Further, Legal produces similar results; it 
yields the negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level in all columns. 
The coefficient of Decentralization takes the negative sign in all estimations and it is 
statistically significant with the exception of column (5). This is in line with previous 
research (Escaleras and Register 2010; Toya and Skidmore 2010). Thus, quality of 
institution and decentralization are associated with lower numbers of deaths from 
natural disasters. Concerning the other control variables, I intend to focus on the 
statistically significant results. The significant negative sign of Openness in columns (1) 
and (3) is in line with Toya and Skidmore (2007; 2010). This, to a certain degree, implies 
that the import of advanced disaster preventive technology reduces the damage caused 
by natural disasters. The significant positive sign of Land suggests that natural 
disasters more frequently occur when the land size is larger. This reflects the higher 
probability that natural disasters will occur in larger countries, when all other things 
are considered equal. The significant positive sign of Population shows that larger 
populations are more likely to be exposed to the shock of natural disasters. Ethnic 
fractionalization produces the positive sign and is statistically significant in all columns. 
This is contrary to the results of Escaleras and Register (2010), but consistent with 
their expectation. This result can be interpreted as suggesting that Ethnic 
fractionalization heightens ethnic tensions, which makes it more difficult for a country 
to agree on and develop public services such as disaster mitigation. The significant 
positive signs of Liberty in columns (1)–(3) reflects that civil and political liberty 
enables people to prepare more appropriately for the occurrence of unforeseen events 
such as natural disasters. 
I now turn to the key interaction terms presented in Table 4(a). I see from column 
(1) that Corruption*Decentralization yields the negative sign and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level, whereas Legal*Decentralization produces the negative sign 
and is not statistically significant. The correlation coefficient between Corruption and 
Legal is 0.71 at the 1% level. Hence, there is the possibility that collinearity between 
them has caused the insignificant result of Legal*Decentralization. The results in 
columns (3) and (5) are less likely to suffer from the problem of collinearity because 
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Corruption and Legal are included separately. In column (3), the coefficient of 
Corruption*Decentralization continues to take the significant negative sign. In contrast, 
in column (5), the coefficient of Legal*Decentralization takes a significant sign while 
z-statistics is –2.00, which are statistically significant at the 5% level. These results are 
consistent with Hypothesis 1. As for Corruption*Decentralization*Ln(GDP), in columns 
(2) and (4), its coefficient took the negative sign and was statistically significant at the 
1% level. With respect to Legal*Decentralization*Ln(GDP), in column (2), its sign was 
positive despite being statistically significant. However, after controlling for collinearity 
in column (6), its sign became the predicted negative and was statistically significant. 
These results are congruent to Hypothesis 2. 
The results of Table 4(b) are very similar to those shown in Table 4(a), which are 
consistent with Hypothesis 1 and 2. As exhibited in Table 4(c), I now look at the results 
of the random effects Tobit model using the same sample as in Table 4(b). Columns (1) 
and (2) in Table 4(c) show that the variables‟ coefficients do not yield significant signs 
although they are the predicted negative signs. However, I see from columns (3)–(6) that 
all coefficients continue to take the negative sign and become statistically significant. 
As shown in columns (3) and (5), the absolute values of Corruption*Decentralization 
and Legal*Decentralization are 15.1 and 13.9, respectively. In contrast, as presented in 
columns (4) and (6), those of Corruption*Decentralization*Ln(GDP) and 
Legal*Decentralization*Ln(GDP) are 1.72 and 1.39, respectively. They are distinctly 
larger than those corresponding values in Table 4(b), which are less than 0.01. This may 
be because the estimation results of Table 4(c) are influenced by the over-dispersion of 
the dependent variable. Hence, the magnitude of each interaction term is thought to 
suffer from upward bias. All in all, however, the results of each interaction variable are 
robust to the alternative specifications. The joint consideration of Tables 3, 4(a), (b), and 
(c) reveals that Hypothesis 1 and 2 are strongly supported. 
The enforcement of property rights shapes the basic incentive structures of an 
economy. According to North (1990), “even when efficient property rights are derived, 
they will still typically have features that will be very costly to monitor or enforce, 
reflecting built-in disincentives or at the very least aspects of the exchange that provide 
temptation to renege, shirk, or cheat. In many cases informal constraints will evolve to 
mitigate disincentive consequences” (North 1990, p. 110). As argued previously (Greif 
1994; Hayami 2001), the informal institution based on a norm obeyed by a member of 
the community plays a critical role in preventing opportunistic behavior because of the 
fear of ostracism when the transaction is limited to a community member. However, the 
effectiveness of the norm is limited to the member of the closed community and its 
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importance will decline in the process of economic development. Compared with an 
informal institution, the formal institution is based on a legal system, which acts 
effectively for a non-community member, and has become more important as market 
transactions have become more widespread with economic development. In short, the 
role of the informal institution is more important in developing countries, whereas the 
role of the formal institution is more important in developed countries. The evidence 
provided in this paper is consistent with this view. However, the causality between 
economic development and institutional change is ambiguous. That is, institutional 
change can be considered as a consequence of economic development and economic 
development can be enhanced by institutional change. Therefore, developing countries 
with high-quality institution require greater support because the assistance will be 
more effective. From the evidence presented in this paper, I determine the policy 
implication that the transfer of disaster prevention technology should be extended to 
countries with higher levels of decentralization, less corrupt public sectors, and 
well-established legal systems. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Previous studies have suggested that the determinants of damage caused by 
natural disasters are different between developing and developed countries (Toya and 
Skidmore 2007). The level of economic development can be captured not only by per 
capita GDP, but also by political condition. However, little is known regarding what 
factors cause this difference in damage levels between developing and developed 
countries. With the aim of identifying these factors, this paper used cross-country data 
from 1990 to 2000 to examine the effect of interactions between decentralization, 
institution, and per capita GDP on the number of deaths from natural disasters. It was 
found that decentralization reduces the number of deaths and its effect was greater in 
countries with less public sector corruption and better functioning legal systems. 
Furthermore, the interaction between decentralization and institution had a more 
significant effect on the reduction of deaths in more developed countries. 
The essential technology required to reduce the impact of natural disasters is 
more likely to exist in developed countries than in developing nations. When essential 
technology does not exist,   quality of institution plays only a minor role in the 
mitigation of damage in the event of a natural disaster. If this holds true, from what has 
been shown in this paper, I derive the argument that institutional and political systems 
become more important to ensure the effective of essential technology. If technology is 
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considered to be an input of production, such as educated workers, then it is similar to 
the view that “the ability of local government to operate effectively and thus produce a 
safer environment is greatly enhance by having an educated work force from which to 
hire capable public employees” (Toya and Skidmore 2010, p. 51). Furthermore, it is 
necessary to consider political institutions as a whole in an attempt to design an 
effective disaster prevention measure. That is, I found it critical to investigate the 
interaction between the institutional factors captured by, for instance, decentralization, 
corruption, and legal quality. The effectiveness of decentralization greatly depends on 
institutional circumstance. Further, contrary to previous research that suggested that 
decentralization is not important in reducing the number of deaths from disasters in 
developed countries (Escaleras and Register 2010), institutional quality is considered to 
play an important role in both developing countries and in developed countries in an 
attempt to cope with unforeseen disastrous events. The findings in this paper show that 
disaster prevention technology makes a greater contribution to mitigating the damage 
of natural disasters when governments are more decentralized and less corrupt, and 
that a well-functioning legal system exists. From this, I draw the policy implication that 
the transfer of disaster prevention technology should be extended to more decentralized 
countries if institution is well established. 
As stressed in previous research (Kahn 2005, Escaleras et al., 2007; Escaleras 
and Register 2010), proxies of institution are regarded as endogenous variables, leading 
to endogeneity bias. In this paper, the bias was not controlled for. Hence, the estimation 
results possibly suffer from endogeneity biases stemming from proxy variables for 
institution such as decentralization, corruption, and law and order. It is thus necessary 
to control for such bias. This is a remaining issue to be addressed in future research.  
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Table 1. Definition of variables and their basic statistics  
 Definition  Mean Standard 
error 
Minimum Maximum 
Deaths  Total number of deaths caused by natural disasters 
 
205 1,343 0 21,800 
Corruption Quality of “public sector” ranges from 0 (corrupted) to 6 
(less corrupt) 
4.56 1.31 0 6 
Law and order Quality of “law and order” ranges from 0 (poor) to 6 
(good) 
4.80 1.44 1 6 
Decentralization Share of sub-national (state and local) expenditures (% of 
total expenditure) 
35.4 14.1 1.6 58.7 
Ln(GDP) 
 
Logarithm of GDP per capita 9.00 1.18 5.57 10.4 
Land  Land size (million km2) 1.61 2.87 0.05 9.20 
 
Fertility 
 
Fertility rate 2.28 1.00 1.15 6.5 
Population  Population (hundred million) 
 
0.51 1.23 0.01 9.70 
Openness 
 
Ratio of exports plus imports (% of GDP) 61.5 29.9 12.7 196.2 
Ln(Government size) 
 
Ratio of total government expenditure (% of GDP) 2.76 0.38 1.09 3.77 
Gini Gini coefficients 
 
42.9 8.46 21.1 61.8 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
Index of ethnic fractionalization 0.33 0.24 0.01 0.9 
Political right 
 
Political right ranges from 1 (poor) to 7 (good) 6.30 1.39 1 7 
Civil liberty and 
Political liberty 
 
Average value of Civil liberty and Political liberty 
Civil liberty (and political liberty) ranges from 0 (poor) to 
7 (good) 
5.37 0.96 1.5 6 
Ln(Schooling) 
 
Logarithm of schooling years 2.01 0.39 1.05 2.57 
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Note: Number of observations is 345, which is used for estimations in columns (1)–(3) of Table 3. 
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Table 2. Distribution of deaths 
 
Number of deaths  (%) 
0 58.7 
1–99 26.1 
100–999 10.6 
1000–4999 2.6 
5000–9999 0.5 
10000+ 0.56 
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Table 3. Number of deaths by natural disaster and institutional quality 
(negative binominal model) 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Corruption –0.41** 
(–2.01) 
–0.65*** 
(–3.17) 
 
 
-0.51*** 
(-3.61) 
–0.61*** 
(–4.33 
 
Legal –0.68*** 
(–2.68) 
 –0.91*** 
(–4.05) 
-0.50*** 
(-3.38) 
 –0.61*** 
(–4.52) 
Decentralization –0.04** 
(–2.27) 
–0.03* 
(–1.95) 
–0.04** 
(–2.44) 
-0.03** 
(-2.10) 
–0.02 
(–1.59) 
–0.04*** 
(–3.00) 
Ln(GDP ) 0.38 
(1.08) 
0.25 
(0.61) 
0.51 
(1.36) 
0.61*** 
(2.77) 
0.32*10-6* 
(1.67) 
0.60** 
(2.56) 
Land  0.20** 
(2.37) 
0.16* 
(1.94) 
0.19** 
(2.29) 
0.17*** 
(3.22) 
0.11** 
(2.01) 
0.18*** 
(3.45) 
Fertility 
 
–0.90** 
(–2.07) 
–0.35 
(–0.89) 
–1.05** 
(–2.72) 
   
Population  0.59*** 
(4.76) 
0.56*** 
(3.72) 
0.62*** 
(5.28) 
0.52*** 
(5.43) 
0.35*** 
(3.86) 
0.59*** 
(5.58) 
Openness 
 
–0.01** 
(–2.18) 
–0.01 
(–1.03) 
–0.01** 
(–2.54) 
   
Ln(Government 
size) 
–0.54 
(–0.69) 
–0.40 
(–0.61) 
–1.01 
(–1.34) 
   
Gini 0.02 
(0.74) 
0.03 
(1.09) 
0.01 
(0.50) 
   
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
2.56** 
(2.03) 
2.82** 
(2.25) 
2.70** 
(2.00) 
3.23*** 
(2.90) 
4.62*** 
(4.14) 
3.28*** 
(2.97) 
Political right 
 
0.19 
(0.86) 
0.48* 
(1.72) 
0.10 
(0.45) 
0.13 
(0.75) 
0.20 
(0.88) 
0.06 
(0.35) 
Liberty –0.89* 
(–1.84) 
–1.43** 
(–2.06) 
–0.83* 
(–1.84) 
-0.56 
(-1.37) 
–0.74 
(–1.47) 
–0.67 
(–1.47) 
Ln(Schooling)  –0.15 
(–0.22) 
–0.38 
(–0.50) 
–0.31 
(–0.39) 
   
Trend 
 
–-0.01 
(–0.33) 
–0.04 
(–1.33) 
0.003 
(0.09) 
-0.0006 
(-0.02) 
–0.03 
(–1.41) 
0.008 
(0.29) 
Constant 
 
11.9*** 
(3.19) 
10.9*** 
(2.81) 
12.4*** 
(3.38) 
3.66 
(1.60) 
5.53** 
(2.41) 
3.10 
(1.29) 
Log 
pseudo-likelihood 
–1196 –1200 –1199 –1188 –1995 –1995 
Observations 345  345 345 539 539 539 
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Table 4(a). Number of deaths by natural disaster and institutional quality (negative binominal model): sample of column (1) in Table 3 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All independent variables used in column (1) of Table 3 are also included, but not reported to save 
space. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Corruption*Decentralization –0.05*** 
(–3.36) 
 –0.05*** 
(–3.88) 
   
Corruption*Decentralization* 
Ln(GDP per capita) 
 -0.006*** 
(-4.32) 
 –0.005*** 
(–4.31) 
  
Legal*Decentralization 
 
–0.002 
(–0.14) 
   –0.02** 
(–2.00) 
 
Legal*Decentralization*Ln(GDP 
per capita) 
 0.01 
(1.27) 
   –0.002** 
(–2.15) 
Log pseudo-likelihood –1189 -1185 –1189 –1186 –1194 –1193 
Observations 345  345 345 345  345 345 
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Table 4(b). Number of deaths by natural disaster and institutional quality (negative binominal model): sample of column (4) in Table 3 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All independent variables used in column (4) of Table 3 are also included, but not reported to save 
space. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Corruption* Decentralization –0.01 
(–1.55) 
 –0.03*** 
(–3.69) 
   
Corruption*Decentralization* 
Ln(GDP per capita) 
 –0.002* 
(–1.81) 
 –0.002*** 
(–3.25) 
  
Legal* Decentralization 
 
–0.02*** 
(–2.63) 
   –0.02*** 
(–4.33) 
 
Legal*Decentralization*Ln(GDP 
per capita) 
 –0.0007 
(–0.88) 
   –0.002*** 
(–3.61) 
Log pseudo-likelihood –1977 –1978 –1980 –1979 –1978 –1981 
Observations 539 539 539 539 539 539 
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Table 4(c). Number of deaths by natural disaster and institutional quality (random effects Tobit model): sample of column (4) in Table 3 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are z-statistics. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All 
independent variables used in column (4) of Table 3 are also included, but not reported to save space. 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Corruption* Decentralization –8.45 
(–0.96) 
 –15.1** 
(–2.00) 
   
Corruption*Decentralization* 
Ln(GDP per capita) 
 –1.17 
(–1.24) 
 –1.72*** 
(–2.64) 
  
Legal*Decentralization 
 
–10.1 
(–1.39) 
   –13.9** 
(–2.25) 
 
Legal*Decentralization*Ln(GDP 
per capita) 
 –0.64 
(–0.79) 
   –1.39** 
(–2.44) 
Log likelihood –2614 –2613 –2615 –2614 –2614 –2614 
Observations 539 539 539 539 539 539 
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Appendix              Table A1.     List of countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name of countries 
Columns 
(1)–(3) 
Columns (4)–(6) 
1 Argentina ### ### 
2 Argentina # ### 
3 Australia ### ### 
4 Austria ### ### 
5 Bolivia ## ### 
6 Botswana # # 
7 Brazil ## ### 
8 Canada ### ### 
9 Chile ## ### 
10 China 
 
## 
11 Costa Rica ### ### 
12 Denmark 
 
### 
13 Dominican ### ### 
14 Finland ### ### 
15 France ### ### 
16 Hungary ### ### 
17 Iceland 
 
### 
18 India ## ### 
19 Indonesia ## ### 
20 Ireland ### ### 
21 Israel # ### 
22 Italy ### ### 
23 Kenya # ### 
24 Malaysia ## ### 
25 Mexico ### ### 
26 Netherlands ### ### 
27 New Zealand ### ### 
28 Nicaragua ## ### 
29 Norway ### ### 
30 Panama # ### 
31 Paraguay # ## 
32 Peru # ### 
33 Philippines # ## 
34 Portugal ### ### 
35 South Africa ## ## 
36 Spain ### ### 
37 Sweden ### ### 
38 Switzerland ### ### 
39 Thailand ## ## 
40 Trinidad & Tobago # ## 
41 United Kingdom ### ### 
42 United States ### ### 
43 Uruguay # ### 
44 Zimbabwe # # 
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Note: List shows countries used for estimations in each column of Tables 3 and 4. #, 
##, and ### denote countries appearing in the sample only once, two to three times, 
four times or more, respectively. 
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Table A2. Source of data 
Note: With the exception of the World Bank (2011) and ICRG, the data was obtained 
from the internet as follows: 
a. http://www.emdat.be (accessed on June 1, 2011). 
b.http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm 
(accessed on February 08, 2012). 
c. http://salvatorebabones.com/data-downloads. (accessed on June 1, 2011). 
d. http://www.econ.upf.edu/~reynal/data_web.htm (accessed on December 1, 2011). 
e. http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset (accessed on June 2, 2011). 
f.http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/dem_civ_and_pol_lib-democracy-civil-and-politica
l-liberties(accessed on February 15, 2012). 
g.http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,conten
tMDK:20700002~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html(access
ed on June 2, 2011). 
 
 
 
まｎmamam 
 Source 
Deaths  EM-DAT (Emergency Events Database)a 
Corruption International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
Law and order International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
Decentralization IMF‟s Government Finance Statistics (GFS). b 
GDP per capita World Bank (2011) 
Land  World Bank (2011) 
Fertility World Bank (2011) 
Population  World Bank (2011) 
Openness World Bank (2011) 
Government size World Bank (2011) 
Gini Salvatore (2008)c 
Ethnic fractionalization HP of Marta Reynal-Querold 
Political right Freedom house 1996. This was available from Home page 
of Shleifer, A. used in La Porta et al.(1999)e 
Civil and political liberty Freedom house 2001f 
Schooling years Easterly and Levine (1997)e 
